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Abstract
The Next Generation Air Transportation System
will introduce new, advanced sensor technologies
into the cockpit. With the introduction of such
systems, the responsibilities of the pilot are ex-
pected to dramatically increase. In the ALARMS
(ALerting And Reasoning Management System)
project for NASA, we focus on a key challenge
of this environment, the quick and efficient han-
dling of aircraft sensor alerts. It is infeasible to
alert the pilot on the state of all subsystems at
all times. Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to
the true hazard state despite the evidence of the
alerts, and there is uncertainty as to the effect and
duration of actions taken to address these alerts.
This paper reports on the first steps in the con-
struction of an application designed to handle
Next Generation alerts. In ALARMS, we have
identified 60 different aircraft subsystems and
20 different underlying hazards. In this pa-
per, we show how a Bayesian network can be
used to derive the state of the underlying haz-
ards, based on the sensor input. Then, we pro-
pose a framework whereby an automated sys-
tem can plan to address these hazards in coop-
eration with the pilot, using a Time-Dependent
Markov Process (TMDP). Different hazards and
pilot states will call for different alerting automa-
tion plans. We demonstrate this emerging ap-
plication of Bayesian networks and TMDPs to
cockpit automation, for a use case where a small
number of hazards are present, and analyze the
resulting alerting automation policies.
1 Introduction
Next Generation Air Transportation System technologies
will introduce new, advanced sensor technologies into the
∗This author conducted this work while at Aptima, Inc.
cockpit. With the introduction of such systems, the respon-
sibilities of the pilot and the density of air traffic are both
expected to dramatically increase (Joint Planning and De-
velopment Office, 2007). As a result, the number of poten-
tial hazards and relevant information that must be perceived
and processed by the pilot will grow. This information is
likely to come from a variety of sources, requiring the pi-
lot to integrate this information in order to evaluate haz-
ard potential. Evaluating hazard potential will depend on
the consideration of, and differentiation between, immedi-
ate (current) hazards and situations requiring re-planning
or coordination (future). It will also require reasoning un-
der uncertainty, as the actual state of the world needs to be
reasoned from the hazards, and also a plan needs to be con-
structed for the pilot and artificial aircraft intelligence to
handle the hazards, despite uncertainty as to the effective-
ness of each, and temporal uncertainty about the duration
required to handle each hazard.
To support these challenging responsibilities, the pilot has
an unambiguous need for an Integrated Alerting and Notifi-
cation (IAN) system that will continuously monitor multi-
ple sources of interdependent information to evaluate haz-
ard potentials, track multiple potential hazards, provide
caution/warning/alerting (CWA) notifications and context-
relevant decision support to the pilot, and determine the
best method of presenting this information to ensure that
the information can be viewed and used efficiently and ef-
fectively. There are two broad challenges that need to be
addressed before an IAN system can become operational.
First, existing methods cannot reason under uncertainty
about the proposed scale of information and hazards in
such a time-critical environment (Proctor, 1998; Song and
Kuchar, 2003). Specifically, these methods do not provide
a robust approach for integrating, interpreting, and provid-
ing recommendations that can be generated by the diverse
and large set of data expected within the NextGen concept
of operations. Second, the interaction between a human
pilot and an automated system is complex (Galster, 2003)
and also uncertain, and the design of an advanced alerting
technology must leverage methods for ensuring effective
collaborative performance of the human-system team.
Figure 1: The ALARMS approach. Hazards in the environment are detected by aircraft sensors, and pilot state is estimated
through Cognitive Work Analysis in the Human Performance module. A Bayesian Network (State Estimation) weights
the sensor output to estimate the hazard state. A Planning module forms a time-sensitive plan for the pilot and automated
system to address these hazards. The result is a plan with various stages of automation. The ALARMS Interface displays
information at the appropriate stage to the pilot.
2 ALARMS Approach
To address these challenges, we have designed and sim-
ulated an ALerting And Reasoning Management System
(ALARMS). The ALARMS approach is shown in Figure
1. Hazards exist in the real world, as depicted on the left
of the diagram. The sensors on the Flight Deck (current
and NextGen) perceive these hazards. In the first phase of
the ALARMS effort, Aptima cooperated with the Aircraft
Simulation and Hardware-in-the-Loop Lab to identify the
hazards and sensor systems, and quantify the relationship
between them. The results of this effort will be described
in the next section. We used the results of this analysis to
construct probability tables for a State Estimation Bayesian
Network, labeled ”State Estimation” in the Figure 1. The
input to the State Estimation Bayesian Network is the alerts
issued by the sensor systems on the aircraft. The output is
an estimate of the probability and severity estimate of the
underlying hazards. Once the hazard and pilot state is esti-
mated, the information is sent to the ALARMS Planning
module, which will construct a plan to address the haz-
ards. The Planning module is a TMDP (Time-Dependent
Markov Decision Processes) (Boyan and Littman, 2000).
The TMDP model can be used to capture both state uncer-
tainty in the environment as well as duration uncertainty in
human (pilot) actions (Schurr and Marecki, 2008). Its input
is the hazard and pilot states, as well as a Markov model of
the effectiveness of the pilot and automation in handling
the hazards, given various levels of alert. Its output is a
time-dependent plan for addressing the alert. The plan is
interpreted by the Stages of Automation module, which in-
terprets the level of automation and decides what level of
alerts and options to send to the pilot. This decision will
then be sent to the ALARMS interface, which displays the
information to the pilot.
In this paper, we report on the phase of the ALARMS ef-
fort corresponding to the “Integrated System User Model”
in Figure 1. The Integrated System User Model is part of
the greater ALARMS effort. Other parts of the ALARMS
effort are shown in Figure 1 as well, and involve mod-
eling and predicting human performance. Through Cog-
nitive Work Analysis (CWA) (Vicente, 1999), ALARMS
has focused on allowing the system to predict pilot per-
formance in an online fashion. This module is labeled
“Human Performance” in the figure. Whereas we will see
that the current work involves a primitive model of pilot
state which accounts for the phase of flight, in future work
the Pilot State Estimate will be constructed using tech-
niques from the cognitive sciences literature, resulting in
a richer pilot state space for the Integrated System User
Model (Latorella, 1999). Another, orthogonal task, is la-
beled “ALARMS Interface” in Figure 1. In this task, we are
leveraging established human factors design principles to
develop an interface that (1) maximizes pilot performance
in detecting and responding to a diverse set of threats, and
(2) is flexible in its integration with existing NextGen fea-
tures and the concepts of operations. The interface is being
designed to support various stages of automation (Galster,
2003). At low stages, decisions are made almost entirely
by the pilot, whereas at high-stages of automation they are
made by the system. At medium stages of automation, de-
cisions are cooperative, for example the system may pre-
compute several options for complex maneuvers, and let
the pilot select from these options.
2.1 ALARMS Hazard Matrix
As the first step in the ALARMS effort, we combined with
the Aircraft Simulation and Hardware-in-the-Loop Labo-
ratory to identify (1) Current and Next Generation aircraft
Figure 2: Color-coded entries of the hazard matrix repre-
sent the level of alert, which in turn corresponds to the time-
frame in which that alert must be addressed.
systems. (2) Aircraft Hazards. (3) The interaction between
systems and hazards. The ALARMS hazard matrix was
constructed as a result of this work, and a small portion
of this matrix is shown in Figure 3. Each row represents
a tool, technology, or system that can issue an alert in the
next generation cockpit. Each column represents a poten-
tial environment in the hazard. Thus, there is an entry for
each case where a sensor can issue an alert for a given haz-
ard.
Entries also color-coded with labels D/W/C/A (Direc-
tive/Warning/Caution/Advisory). These labels, presented
in order of decreasing urgency, represent the highest level
of alert possible for the sensor/hazard combination. Thus,
entries labeled “A” correspond to systems that will only is-
sue low level advisories for that given hazard, whereas en-
tries labeled “W”, such as an Adverse Weather hazard from
the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EG-
PWS), correspond to systems that are capable of issuing
a more urgent warning. Alert level also corresponds to the
timeframe in which the hazard must be addressed, accord-
ing to Figure 2.
2.2 ALARMS Bayesian Network
The goal of the ALARMS effort is to construct a plan for
handling sensor alerts; however, it is not truly the sensor
alerts that must be handled, it is the underlying hazards
which they represent. For example, multiple subsystems
(such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) and Cockpit Display
of Traffic Information (CDTI)) can issue alerts which re-
late to an Altitude Deviation hazard. The ALARMS sys-
tem should deduce that there may be an Altitude Deviation
hazard if either of these sensors issue an alert, and the haz-
ard should be more certain and urgent if both systems issue
one.
In order to model the sensor systems, a Bayesian network
was built, as shown in Figure 4. Ovals on the right represent
hazards, corresponding to the columns of the ALARMS
hazard matrix. Ovals on the left represent hazard alerts
from sensors, corresponding to the entries in the hazard
matrix. Directionality proceeds from right to left, indicat-
ing that hazards cause sensor alerts. However reasoning
proceeds from left to right, the sensor output will act as ev-
idence and the hazard level on the right is deduced. Each
entry on both sides can exist at several levels (Advisory,
Caution, Warning, Directive), according to the severity of
the hazard and the sensor alert.
The Bayesian network itself is modeled as noisy-or. The
hazard itself can exist at several levels, and the level or
severity of the hazard is evidenced by the subsystem alerts.
To feed into the next part of the system, a threshold is ap-
plied, to find the highest level alert for which there is evi-
dence.
To construct the network, the GeNIE (Graphical Network
Interface) and SMILE (Structural Modeling, Inference, and
Learning Engine) software packages were used, from the
Decision Systems Laboratory at the University of Pitts-
burgh (Druzdzel, 1999).
2.3 TMDP Planner
We now recall the TMDP model and then show how the
ALARMS planning module employs it. Time Dependent
Markov Decision Processes (TMDPs) (Boyan and Littman,
2000) assume a finite set S of discrete states and a finite
set A of actions. When action a ∈ A is executed in state
s ∈ S, the process transitions with probability P s,a(s′) to
some state s′ ∈ S. The transition itself is not instanta-
neous; it consumes t units of time with probability ds,as′ (t)
where ds,as′ ∈ D is a probability density function (a.k.a.
action duration distribution) for a given s, a, s′. Similarly,
the reward Rs,as′ (t) that the transition provides depends on
s, a, s′ as well as on the time t at which the process enters
state s′. (Note, that t in ds,as′ (t) is the transition duration
whereas t in Rs,as′ (t) is the time at which the transition ter-
minates.) A deterministic TMDP policy pi is therefore a
mapping S × [0,∆] → A where ∆ (a.k.a. the deadline) is
the earliest point in time after which all the rewardsRs,as′ (t)
are zero. Denote by V pi(s, t) the total expected reward for
following a policy pi from state s at time t. (For a given
s, V pi(s, t) is often viewed as a continuous value function
over t ∈ [0,∆].) The optimal TMDP policy pi∗ thus sat-
isfies V pi
∗
(s, t) ≥ V pi(s, t) for all s ∈ S, t ∈ [0,∆] and
pi 6= pi∗.
Let Ψ be the set of alert levels (e.g. “Nominal” (N), “Ad-
visory” (A), “Caution” (C), “Warning” (W), or “Directive”
(D)), Φ be an ordered set of hazards (e.g. “Weather” (haz-
ard 1), “Altitude Deviation” (hazard 2)) and Ω be a set of
autonomy levels (e.g. “No Autonomy” (0), “Some Auton-
omy” (1), or “Full Autonomy” (2)). A TMDP in ALARMS
planing module is instantiated as follows:
• States: A state s ∈ S is a mapping from the hazards
to their alert levels. That is, s = (ψφ)φ∈Φ is a vector
where ψφ ∈ Ψ is the alert level of hazard φ ∈ Φ. For
example, given three hazards, state s = (N,A,W )
defines that the first hazard is at Nominal level, the
second hazard is at Advisory level, and the third haz-
Figure 3: A portion of the ALARMS hazard matrix. Each row represents a different sensor subsystem (blue rows are
aviation systems, green rows are navigation systems), each column after the Hazards label represents a potential aircraft
hazard. Color-coded entries represent the highest urgency alert that the sensor system may issue.
ard is at Warning Level.
• Actions: The actions of the ALARMS system repre-
sent the different ways in which the system displays
the information about the hazards on the pilot’s GUI.
In general, the higher the degree of autonomy ωφ ∈ Ω
for a hazard φ ∈ Φ, the less intrusive the way in which
the information about hazard φ is presented on the pi-
lot’s GUI. An action a ∈ A is therefore represented by
a vector (ωφ)φ∈Φ. For example, given three hazards,
action a = (1, 3, 2) will mark on the pilot’s GUI the
information about hazard 1 to be pilot-intensive (au-
tonomy level 1), the information about hazard 2 to be
highly automated (autonomy level 3) and the informa-
tion about hazard 3 to be somewhat automated (auton-
omy level 2). There is also a special autonomy level
0 reserved for actions that do not address the hazard
at all (the pilot is not informed about a hazard and the
automation does not address it).
• Transitions: ALARMS assumes that all the hazards
will eventually be addressed (their alert levels will re-
turn to “Nominal” (N) values) as a result of human or
autonomy actions. That is, for all states s ∈ S and
actions a ∈ A, P s,a(s′) = 1 only for s′ = (ψφ)φ∈Φ
such that ψφ = N for all φ ∈ Φ. An exception to the
above is when the action is not to address the hazard,
in which case the state remains the same.
• Durations: ALARMS models action duration distri-
butions by assuming that actions at a high level of au-
tomation take place quickly whereas actions at a low
level of automation (i.e. that involve the pilot) have
a longer duration. In essence, an attentive pilot will
be more efficient at addressing hazards whereas an
inattentive or overburdened pilot will perform poorly.
As part of the ALARMS effort, profiles of pilot per-
formance have been constructed at various phases of
flight. The phase of flight affects pilot attentiveness,
which in turn affects the action duration distributions.
In the next phase of the ALARMS project, we expect
to construct richer models of pilot state, based on Cog-
nitive Work Analysis (CWA).
• Rewards: Reward is achieved for addressing the haz-
ard and transitioning back to a nominal state. (Each
hazard can have a different reward associated with
it.) Actions with a low level of automation (haz-
ards handled by the pilot) accumulate greater reward,
whereas actions taken with a higher level of automa-
tion (handled by the system, without pilot feedback)
achieve a lower level of reward. As actions that pro-
vide higher rewards usually take longer to execute,
given a time deadline ∆ after which no rewards can
be earned, an optimal TMDP policy must often trade-
off high reward actions for their faster, but lower re-
ward counterparts. We illustrate these trade-offs in the
next Section, where optimal TMDP policies are found
using the CPH algorithm (Marecki et al., 2007). In
this work, we assume low levels of automation repre-
sent GUIs that provide more information to the pilot,
which achieves higher reward. The assumption is lim-
ited to the reward and transition model, which is easily
changed if desired.
3 Application
We constructed an analysis tool to allow the flight deck de-
signer to understand the behavior of the flight deck for dif-
ferent hazard and pilot states. A picture of the tool can be
Figure 4: The ALARMS Bayesian Network.
seen in Figure 5. In the example shown, four sensor sys-
tems are considered (Weather Radar, Ice Protection, VNAV,
and CDTI) which provide alerts. Options for the level of
alert (Directive/Warning/Caution/Advisory/None) are con-
figurable through an .xml file. The systems are run through
the Bayesian Network to determine the underlying hazard
state. Adjustable sliders allow the user to configure the re-
wards for addressing each hazard. (Since the TMDP re-
ward function is defined using rewards for addressing the
actual underlying hazards, instead of the sensor system re-
wards, the reward for the hazard is merely the maximum of
the connected sensor system rewards). Phase of Flight can
also be selected to determine the pilot state. Clicking the
“Run” button induces the program to perform two actions:
(1) It reads in the Bayes Net (in .xml format), and finds
the underlying hazards by using the user-selected GUI op-
tions as evidence and (2) It builds and solves the underlying
TMDP to find an optimal plan that addresses the hazards,
and plots the results.
For our example problems containing four sensors and two
hazards, the Bayesian computation took less than a second,
and the CPH solver found the optimal solution in 40.5 sec-
onds. For aircraft deployment, we anticipate producing the
TMDP policies for hazard combinations in advance, and
at flight time implementing the resulting policies through a
lookup table.
Figure 5 displays the policies for various hazard and pi-
lot states. The horizontal axes in all the plots mark time,
and without loss of generality the graphs assume there is a
deadline at the 20 second mark. The vertical axes represent
the expected value (=sum of expected rewards). Differing
actions are plotted in different colors (or can be seen as
a break in the graph for those who read this in black and
white). The action with the largest expected value for a
given point in time should be executed if a decision is to be
made at that point in time.
Consider the first plot in Figure 5, with two hazards to be
addressed: hazard 1 = “Weather” and hazard 2 = “Alti-
tude Deviation”. The TMDP state considered in this plot is
(A,N) which means that the “Weather” hazard is in Advi-
sory mode and the “Altitude Deviation” hazard is in Nom-
inal mode. As can be seen, when the deadline is > 5 sec-
onds away, action “L10” (shorthand for “Handle Hazard 1
at automation level 1, Handle Hazard 2 at automation level
0”) is selected, the pilot is expected to handle the “Weather”
hazard with some importance and the “Altitude Deviation”
hazard with no importance. However, as we approach the
deadline, action “L20” is more preferable, as automation
level “2” is expected to act more quickly, thus potentially
providing reward more quickly. (Note that only the upper
envelope, that is the parts of the value functions that are
not dominated by other value functions, are shown in the
Figure.)
Subsequent plots in Figure 6 show how the optimal TMDP
policy changes when we consider different states. The Fig-
ure 6a shows the optimal policy for a state (C,A). Notice,
that when the deadline is far away, both hazards are as-
signed to the pilot (automation level 1, the portion of the
curve shown in green). However, as the deadline nears, the
system deduces that there is not sufficient time for the pilot
to handle both hazards. Consequently, the system assigns
the less severe hazard (“Altitude Deviation”) to the automa-
tion, shown as the purple portion of the curve on the right
of the graph. Conversely in (Figure 6b), when we set a
higher relative reward for addressing the “Altitude Devia-
tion” hazard (seen on the number next to the slider bars on
the right), as the deadline approaches, the system makes the
opposite decision. It assigns the less prioritized (rewarded)
Figure 5: The ALARMS application. The top plot shows an Advisory for one hazard, the bottom plot was generated by
changing the Advisory to a Caution (resulting in a doubling/rescaling of the y-axis).
hazard (“Weather”) to the automation. On the right of the
application, under “Actions”, we can see that the purple
right-portion of the plot now represents “L21” instead of
“L12”. Finally, the last plot in Figure 6 shows the effects
of changing the phase of flight on the TMDP policy. By
changing the phase of flight from “Enroute” to “Land”, the
assumptions about the pilot state have changed. During the
Landing phase, the pilot is assumed to be less efficient than
usual at performing tasks, and thus the cross-over point be-
tween actions is shifted left, reflecting the fact that the ac-
tion with the higher level of automation is favored farther
away from the deadline than in the graphs above it.
4 Related Work
There are many works on the use of Bayesian networks
for diagnosis (Andreassen et al., 1987; Breese et al., 2000).
The idea of a time-dependent Markov model was first men-
tioned in (Boyan and Littman, 2000), and has been adapted
for application (Rachelson et al., 2008). Progress towards
solving these problems in fast time was made in recent pub-
lications (Feng et al., 2004; Li and Littman, 2005; Marecki
et al., 2007).
Systems where MDPs or POMDPs were used for ad-
justable autonomy include (Scerri et al., 2002; Varakan-
tham et al., 2005). These works did not allow for error
checking or further consideration once an assignment was
made. Furthermore, the state space was very large, not tak-
ing advantage of the TMDP framework, resulting in thou-
sands of states for similarly sized problems.
As the cockpit has grown more complicated, numerous
work has been published studying the effects on pilots.
Cognitive Work Analysis has been used in order to model
the effects of varying system states on pilot workload, and
the effects of workload on performance (Vicente, 1999).
(a) Two hazards. The second hazard is handled at a higher level of automation, close to the deadline.
(b) The second hazard reward is increased via the values next to the slider bars, thus now it is handled by the pilot.
(c) Reward as in (a), but phase of flight is changed to land. The pilot’s attention is diverted and the graph is shifted left as compared to
(a).
Figure 6: The ALARMS application
Much work attempts to study the interaction between the
human pilot and the automated system and include the lev-
els of automation concept (Galster, 2003; Parasuraman et
al., 2000). However, these works have not produced algo-
rithms, whereby the assignment of tasks to pilot and human
were varied automatically in a planned manner.
5 Conclusion
In the ALARMS project, we have developed several com-
ponents necessary for operation of aircraft in a NextGen
environment. First, a study of existing systems was con-
ducted, and a matrix correlating aircraft sensor output (both
legacy and NextGen) with real-world hazards was con-
structed. Second, this matrix was used to create a Bayesian
Network whereby sensor output becomes evidence, and
the presence and severity of real-world hazards is derived.
Third, a TMDP model was created, allowing the aircraft
sensor system to select the appropriate level of automation
which best addresses hazards in a time-dependent environ-
ment. Finally, a demonstration application was created,
linking the applications and thereby producing automation
plans directly from the simulated sensor output.
Future work will continue in several directions. First,
TMDP models will be scaled to handle not just the use
cases from the demonstration application, but the whole
Bayesian network. Second, work from the cognitive sci-
ences literature will be leveraged to better estimate the pi-
lot state. Third, we will consider the time-sensitive nature
of the automated components, as in (Hansen and Zilber-
stein, 2001). Finally, we will develop a user interface based
on levels of automation. Through the combined efforts of
hazard state estimation, pilot state estimation, and human-
automation planning, it is our hope to provide a robust,
smooth transition to the Next Generation aircraft cockpit.
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